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Abstract 
Seasonal work programs are increasingly advocated by international aid agencies as a way of enabling both developed 
and developing countries to benefit from migration. They are argued to provide workers with n~w.ski~/s and allow them 
to send remillances home, without the receiving country having to worry about long-term ass1mlfatwn and the source 
country worrying about permanent loss of skills. However, formal evidence as to the development impact of seasonal 
worker programs is non-existent. This paper provides the firsT such evaluation, studying New Zealand's new Recognized 
Seasonal Employer (RSE) program which allows Pacific Island migrants to work in horticulture and viticulture in New 
Zealand for up to seven months per year. We use baseline and follow-up waves of surveys we are carrying out in Tonga 
To form difference-in-difference and propensity score matching estimates of short-term impacts on household income 
and consumpTion. 
Introduction 
A growing literature suggests that seasonal work 
programs (SWPs) are part of the new landscape of global 
agriculture that can be ''win-win" for both developed and 
developing countries (GCIM, 2005; Pritchett, 2006). 
These SWPs appear to offer many of the benefits of 
migration - such as relieving tabor shmtages in 
de' eloped countries and aiding development in 
developing countries - with fev. of the perceived costs -
such as pennanent loss of talent in developing countries, 
and social stress, fiscal costs and iiTeversibility in 
developed countries. 
Many countries have SWPs, with a 2003 ILO survey 
finding over 500 bilaterallabor agreements. 1 Amongst the 
most widely studied of these, the Canadian Seasonal 
Agriculture Workers Program (SA WP) has been 
recruiting Caribbean workers for over forty years, and 
Mexican workers since 1974 (Brem, 2006). The SA WP 
lets 20,000 seasonal migrants work in Canadian 
agriculture for up to eight months per year. Other 
examples include 5,500 Moroccan mothers, who pick 
strawbenies in Spain for a fow· month season, and 16,500 
Bulgarians and Romanians who fill swnmer jobs in UK 
agriculture under the Seasonal Agricultural Workers 
Scheme. 2 Perhaps the largest program involves 300,000 
Polish guestworkers who can work for up to four months 
in German agriculture (Hess, 2006). 
But robust evidence on the development impact of 
seasonal worker programs is non-existent. While claims 
are made about development impacts based on sw-veys of 
seasonal agricultural workers (Basok, 2000), these 
surveys lack baseline information from before the 
workers migrated and do not have control groups to see 
what would have happened to the supplying households 
in the absence of the seasonal migration. Similar 
methodological problems affect studies of internal 
seasonal migration, which typically rely on cross-
sectional data with no way of controlling for migrant self-
selectivity (Haberfeld, et al. 1999).3 
ln this paper we report more robust impact estimates, for 
New Zealand's new Recognised Seasonal Employer 
(RSE) scheme. The RSE began in 2007 and aims to aid 
economic development in the Pacific Islands while easing 
labor shortages in New Zealand's horticulture and 
viticultw-e industries (Ramasamy et al, 2008). Under the 
RSE, up to 5000 workers from eligible Pacific Island 
countries are recruited to work in New Zealand for seven 
months per eleven month period and can rettrrn in future 
seasons if recruited again. The employer pays half of the 
return airfare from the worker's home country and 
provides stipulated minimum how-s of work at how-ly or 
piece rates typical of those received by local workers for 
equivalent work in the same period and region. Typical 
jobs for RSE workers are pruning trees and vines, picking 
applies, citrus and grapes, and picking and packing 
kiwifruit. Employers also arrange internal transportation 
and accommodation, provide training and equipment, and 
look after other aspects of pastoral care for their seasonal 
workers. 
Our impact estimates are based on two waves of a panel 
survey that we designed specifically for evaluating the 
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RSE. The first wave provides baseline data on households 
before workers left for the first season in New Zealand. In 
addition to households with RSE workers, the samples 
also includes households with individuals who applied to 
participate in the RSE but were not recruited (henceforth 
''RSE applicants"), and households where no individuals 
applied to the RSE (henceforth '~on-applicants"). These 
control groups allow us to deal with two types of 
selection which might otherwise confound the inferences: 
first there is a selection process by firms, labor agents and 
community leaders which determines which applicants 
are recruited from work-ready pools formed in the source 
countries. Second, any self-selection process, whereby 
households decide whether to have members apply for the 
RSE work-ready pool, can be studied by comparing with 
the non-applicants. 
Although our surveys are fielded in the two Pacific 
countries supplying most workers under the RSE -
Vanuatu and Tonga, the estimates reported here are 
restricted to Tonga. Over two-thirds of the Tongan RSE 
workers in our sample had returned home when the 
second wave of ow· survey was fielded (April-June. 2008) 
compared with only 20 percent of the Vanuatu workers. It 
is expensive to send money from New Zealand to the 
Pacific, with the transactions costs for popular money 
transfer operators like Western Union averaging at least 
15 percent (Gibson, McKenzie and Rohorua, 2006). 
Consequently many RSE workers bring most of their 
earnings home in person, rather than sending them from 
in New Zealand. Therefore it is not possible to observe 
the full impact of RSE work on source household 
incomes until the worker has returned at the end of each 
season. The impacts for the V anuatu households and for 
those T ongans who had not yet retwiled by the second 
wave of our survey will be captured by the third survey 
wave, which went into the field in October 2008. 
We restrict attention to estimating impacts, in the form of 
average treatment effects on the treated (A IT). on 
household incomes and consumption. We do not yet 
attempt to estimate broader, community-level impacts on 
inequality or poverty. However prior analysis of the 
baseline data showed that Tongan workers coming 
through the RSE are poorer, more rural and less schooled 
than Tongans not participating in the RSE (Gibson et al. , 
2008).4 Hence any positive impacts on household income 
resulting from participation in the RSE are likely to be 
pro-poor. 
Data 
?ur survey has near national coverage, covering the main 
1sland of Tongatapu, and two of the three outer island 
groups (Vava'u and 'Eua). Collectively these three 
islands contain 90 percent of the population and 
contributed 92 percent of the RSE workers in the first 
season. The sampled villages were based on lists of RSE 
workers and their villages obtained from the Tongan 
Labour Ministry. The town officer in each village 
provided directions to households with RSE workers and 
a random subset of these were interviewed. In each 
village we also used the town officers to identify 
households with RSE applicants who were part of the 
work-ready pool but who had not been recruited, and we 
additionally surveyed households where all members 
were non-applicants. 
In total our baseline survey covered 448 households 
containing 2,335 individuals in 46 villages. The first 
follow-up survey re-interviewed 442 of these households. 
Of these, 181 had a RSE worker ( 1 14 where the worker 
had returned by the wave 2 survey), 116 had a member of 
the work-ready pool who had not been recruited, and 145 
had only non-applicants. Table 1 summarizes baseline 
household-level characteristics for these fow· sample 
groups, along with two-sample !-tests for differences in 
means between the samples. 
The households where RSE workers had already returned 
from their season in New Zealand had similar baseline 
welfare levels and largely similar baselines characteristics 
to those households whose workers were still completing 
their New Zealand contracts (as seen from columns (a) 
and (b)). The only differences are that those still in New 
Zealand came from households with slightly lower adult 
schooling levels and fewer chickens owned, and where 
adults had worked fewer days of hard physical labor at 
the time of the baseline survey. These differences should 
not affect the inferences derived from the two-thirds of 
RSE households with retwned workers. although a more 
complete set of impact estimates will be possible once the 
wave 3 data are available. 
In contrast. there are substantial differences between the 
RSE households and either applicant or non-applicant 
households. The average per capita incomes were over 
250 pa 'anga higher at baseline in applicant households 
and over 400 pa'anga higher in non-applicant 
households.5 The gap in per capita consumption was 
almost as large. These differences in per capita resow·ces 
come from both a larger household size for RSE workers 
and also lower total incomes. Accounting for these pre-
existing differences will be important for valid estimates 
of the impact of RSE work on household incomes. The 
other main differences in characteristics are that RSE 
households have more previous experience of visiting 
New Zealand and also (amongst retumees) had spent 
more days per week engaged in hard physical tabor at the 
time of the baseline survey. 
Estimation Model 
Let ~. and Y0, be the income of a household in two 
counterfactual situations: the treatment (T, =I) of sending 
a household member to work in New Zealand under the 
RSE and non-treatment(7; = 0). For a set of observable 
covariates. X , let P(X, ) be the propensity score. defined 
as: P(X, ) = Pr(7; = tiX, ). The average treatment effect on 
the treated (A TT) can be estimated as: 
A17' :;:: £{£[>';,-Y0,11; = I, P(X,)] } 
= E{E[t;, 'T, = I, P(X,) ]- E[Y0, IT, = 0. P(X,) ]IT, =I } 
(1) 
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which is interpreted as the expected gain in income for 
households with RSE workers compared with what their 
income would have been if not recruited. Conceptually 
the A TT requires a mean for the unobservable 
counterfactual E[.Y IT = 1] so for the observable 
' Ot I 
quantities in equation ( 1) to identify the A TT relies on 
three key conditions introduced into the literature by 
Rosenbaum and Rubin ( 1983). 
First is "unconfoundedness" (Y0, ,r;, l. T,IXj where l. 
denotes independence. According to this, potential 
outcomes are independent of treatment, conditional on the 
observable covariates, X,. Given observable covariates, 
assignment to the treatment group is treated as random 
and any systematic differences in actual outcomes 
between treated and non-treated individuals with the same 
value of the covariates is attributed to the treatment. 
Second is "common support" where all treated 
households have a counterpart in the non-treatment group 
for each x for which we seek to make a compa.rison.6 
I 
This condition would appear to create a dimensionality 
problem when many covariates are matched on; for 
example, if x, contains k covariates which are all 
dichotomous the nwnber of possible matches will be 2*. 
However the propensity score reduces the dimensionality 
of the matching problem because it is possible to match 
on P(X,) which is scalar. rather than on the vector of 
observable variables X ,. This use of P(X,) is valid so 
long as the "balancing" prope11y 
(prob(X,i~ =LP( X ,)= p )= prob(X,I~ = O,P(X, ) = p )) 
holds (Rosenbaum and Rubin , 1983 ). In other words, 
conditional on the propensity score, the means of the 
covariates should be identical across the treannent and 
control groups if the balancing prope11y holds. 
Since the propensity score is a continuous variable it is 
unlikely that there are two observations with exactly the 
same value of P(X, ). so further refinement is needed to 
estimate equation(!). We use a "kernel matching" 
procedure, following Dehejia and Wahba (2002) where 
all treated households are matched with a weighted 
average of non-treated households, with weights inversely 
proportional to the gap between propensity scores of the 
treated and non-treated. The literatW'e comparing 
propensity score matching with experimental benchmarks 
also notes that performance is better if treatment and 
control groups are located in the same labor markets, are 
administered the same questionnaire and if data is 
collected from both the pre- and post-treatment periods so 
a ·difference-in-differences' estimator can be used to 
control for unobserved differences between the treatment 
and control groups. All of these features are present in the 
SW"vey that we use, with a common questionnaire 
obtaining baseline pre-migration and follow-up post-
migration information and fielded in villages that supply 
both the treatment and control groups. 
Results 
An initial accounting of household income components, 
their change over time and the difference in these 
differences between households with RSE workers and 
those with applicants and with non-applicants is reported 
in Table 2. Seven components are considered: earnings in 
Tonga (based on individual repmts for the previous 
week); net (i.e., also taking account of outbound) 
remittances of both money and goods from RSE workers 
(based on household repmts on the previous six months), 
net remittances from other sources; the lump sum of 
repatriated erunings from retwned RSE workers (based 
on a report by the retwned worker); net returns from sales 
of fish, crops, livestock, tapa cloth and mats (based on 
household reports on an average month); the value of 
own-produced or own-captw·ed food consumed by the 
household (based on household reports for the previous 
week); and other income from investments, pensions, 
rentals, etc. (based on household repmts for the previous 
fortnight). Some of these income sources are either a 
lump sum or may come in only part of the year (e.g. 
remittances fi:om RSE workers) so we do not annualize 
them since that may wrongly imply a more continuous, 
and higher, income from some sources. Instead we 
present them on a semi-annual basis, which was roughly 
the period since the baseline survey and also corresponds 
to the period for which RSE related income might accrue, 
given the seven month restriction on time spent in New 
Zealand. We will make estimates of annual income once 
data are available from wave 3 of the survey to add to the 
semi-annual income from wave 2. 
Almost half of income for RSE households and more than 
half for the other households is from subsistence 
production (Table 2, columns (a) to (d)). Repatriated RSE 
earnings and net remittances fi·om RSE workers are the 
next most important income sources for RSE households, 
followed by earnings in Tonga. For non-RSE households, 
earnings in Tonga are the second most important income 
source. Across all sow-ces, the per capita income of RSE 
households is approximately 300 pa' anga higher than for 
applicant and non-applicant households. However this is 
not a valid estimate of the treatment effect of participating 
in the RSE, since it does not take account of the baseline 
differences between the groups of households shown in 
Table 1. 
To get closer to a valid treatment effect, we first consider 
the change in each income component, relative to the 
baseline level, which is reported in columns (e) to (h). 
The per capita (semi-annual) income for RSE households 
is 950 pa · anga higher than at baseline, with the biggest 
contribution from a rise in the value of subsistence 
production / followed by repatriated RSE earnings and 
net remittances from RSE workers. However, this change 
in income for RSE households is also not a valid estimate 
of the treatment effect of participating in the RSE, since it 
does not allow for the possibility that incomes might have 
increased from the baseline values irrespective of RSE 
participation. Indeed, columns (f) and (g) show that both 
applicant and non-applicant households also experienced 
income increases, mainly due to higher subsistence 
production but also due to higher earnings. 
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Instead it is the difference in differences which take 
account of both pre-existing income differences between 
the groups of households and the growth in incomes 
which would have occwTed anyway. These show that per 
capita income for RSE households increased by almost 
600 pa'anga, relative to the increase recorded for 
applicant households and by over 700 pa'anga relative to 
the rise for non-applicant households. There is little 
evidence of crowding out, whereby some traditional 
sources of income fall once non-traditional (RSE) 
incomes become available, with the only statistically 
significant result being a slight fall in net remittances 
from non-RSE sources (only relative to the non-
applicants). The difference in differences is larger when 
compared with non-applicant households, suggesting 
some self-selection into the RSE applicant pool and 
making the applicant households the better counterfactual 
for what would have happened to the RSE households if 
they had not sent a worker to New Zealand. 
However even the differences in differences between 
RSE and applicant households include some households 
in the comparison who may not be very similar. 
Propensity score matching is a way to deal with these 
non-comparable households, by restricting the estimation 
of treatment effects to just those households that obey the 
common supp011 condition. ln order to implement this, 
we use the levels and squares of the baseline variables 
listed in Table I as covariates, and estimate propensity 
scores for RSE households that range from 0.065 to 0.989 
with a mean of0.657. The propensity scores for applicant 
households are much lower, ranging from 0.001 to 0.029, 
with a mean of 0.333.8 Figw·e I illustrates these in the 
form of kernel densities. It is apparent that there while 
some applicant households have characteristics I ike those 
of RSE households, many others do not. Therefore in all 
of the results that follow, estimation of the aYerage 
treatment effect is restricted to the area of common 
support, where the two distributions overlap. 
Figure 1: Propensity Scores for RSE Households and 
Applicant Households 
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Table 3 reports estimates of the treatment effects for total 
per capita income and conswnption, with either 
applicants or all non-RSE households used as the control 
group. We also show results for log income and 
consumption, which is less sensitive to outliers and for 
which the treatment effect is approximately a percentage 
change arising from having a household member 
seasonally work in New Zealand. These estimates suggest 
that per capita income for RSE households increased by 
an average of 520 pa'anga, matching against applicant 
households, or by 570 pa'anga matching against both 
applicant and non-applicant households. 
These estimates are lower by about 60 pa · anga and 100 
pa'anga, compared with the simple difference in 
difference estimates in Table 2. That the treatment effects 
estimate fa lls by more when the non-applicants are 
included in the matching suggests that the appl icants are 
the better counterfactual group for what would have 
happened to RSE households without any seasonal 
migration. This point is emphasized when considering the 
sample sizes that result from imposing the common 
support restriction; 84% (97/116) of the applicant sample 
are still used as a control group but only 69% ( 181 /261) 
of the combined applicant and non-applicant sample are 
used. 
The results in Table 3 for log per capita total income 
suggest that households with RSE workers have 66-76% 
higher incomes than either applicant households or all 
non-RSE households. 9 Two caveats to this estimate are, 
first, that it is for a six-month period and only some of the 
income sources could be relied upon in the other six 
months of a year, given the seasonal natw·e of RSE 
employment, and second, the repatriated earnings of RSE 
workers are assumed to be pooled with other forms of 
household income. ''hen in fact the worker may treat this 
as capital rather than as income and may not pool it with 
other members. 
There is no apparent effect on per capita consumption 
from participation in the RSE. The treatment effects on 
the consumption \'ariables are all statistically insignificant 
and close to zero. There was also no apparent impact on 
consumption in the difference in difference estimates in 
Table 2. It will take longer term monitoring to detetmine 
·whether the higher income of RSE households ultimately 
translates into higher conswnption. 
Conclusions 
Seasonal work programs are an increasingly discussed 
featw·e of global agricultw·e but there is no formal 
evidence evaluating their development impacts. In this 
study we find large short-tenn impacts on household 
incomes for Tongan participants in the new Recognized 
Seasonal Employer program which allows up to seven 
months work per year in New Zealand horticultlU'e and 
viticultw·e. The per capita income of participating 
households is increased by over 500 pa'anga (equivalent 
to almost US$300), although there is no apparent impact 
on consumption. 
Our results also illustrate the importance of formal 
evaluation methods and suitable data. For example, the 
impacts would be understated if just a cross-sectional 
sw·vey was used which ignored pre-existing differences 
Labour, Employment and Work in New Zealand 2008 ")97 
between participants and other households. Conversely, 
impacts would be overstated by just looking at the change 
in income for participants without considering income 
changes amongst control groups. Impacts would also be 
overstated if households that are quite unlike are 
compared in a standard regression approach. More 
flexible methods of comparing households via propensity 
score matching are likely to give the most valid estimates 
of treatment effects and can best inform the ongoing 
debates about the role of seasonal work programs as 
development policy. 
Notes 
I. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
UN Secretary-General, lntemational Migration 
and Development Report. May 16 2006, p. 82. 
Rural Migration News July, 2007.<< 
http:/ /migration. ucdavis.edu/rmn/more.php?id= 12 
28 0 4 0 >> 
de Brauw and Harigaya (2007) are one example of 
internal seasonal migration being studied with 
panel data, but even in their example the ftrst wave 
of the panel survey does not correspond to a pre-
migration baseline. 
In contrast, McKenzie et al. (2008) show that 
although RSE workers from Vanuatu coming to 
New Zealand are mostly male subsistence farmers 
with limited schooling, they are still from 
wealthier households and have better English 
literacy than the average ni-Vanuatu. 
These income estimates are for a semi-annual 
period. In terms of intemationa I cW1·encies. 
approximate exchange rates dw·ing the time of the 
survey are 1 NZD = 1.5 Pa 'anga and 1 USD = 1. 9 
Pa'anga. 
If there are regions where the support of X, does 
not overlap for the o·eated and non-treated groups, 
matching can only be performed over the common 
support region. 
The baseline survey was fielded at the end of the 
dry season in Tonga while the second wave survey 
was fielded 1-2 months after the wet season ended. 
In addition there is a considerable amount of 
feasting for church and family ceremonies in 
Tonga in May and June, which involve killing 
pigs. This conswnption and rainfall seasonality 
and a domestic inflation rate of 12% at the time of 
the wave 2 smvey may account for the rise in 
recorded value of subsistence production. The 
other seasonal pattern is that the main agticultural 
cash crop in Tonga is squash, which is harvested 
and exported at the end of the dry season, and so 
would not show up in the reference period for the 
wave 2 survey. 
8. If applicant and non-applicant households are 
combined, the propensity scores range from 0.00 
to 0.900, with a mean of 0.214. 
9. These are calculated as l OOx[exp (0.508)- 1] and 
lOOx[exp (0.569) - 1]. 
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Table 1: Baseline Characteristics and Monetary Welfare Levels ofTongan Households with RSE Workers, Applicants and Non-Applicants 
Returned RSE RSE still in NZ Applicants Non-applicants 
a b) c (d) 
Household size 5.89 5.54 4.97 ••• 4.7~ ••• 
Adult (>14 years) share ofhousehold 0.65 0.59 0.72 •• 0.68 
Male share of adults 0.55 0.56 0.51 •• 0.52 
Share of adults literate in English 0.93 0.95 0.90 0.96 
Share of adults with schooling beyond Grade 10 0.46 0.38 • 0.49 0.47 
Share of adults who previously visited New Zealand 0.36 0.38 0.19 ••• 0.17 ••• 
Average days of hard physical tabor/person/week 4.94 3.44 ••• 4.11 ••• 4.12 ... 
Number of pigs owned 6.04 5.07 5.46 5.39 
Number of chickens owned 5.82 4.04. 4.91 5.35 
Number of can le owned 0.54 0.36 0.47 0.42 
Number of vehicles owned 0.58 0.63 0.62 0.68 
Per capita total household income 844 803 1093 •• 1247 ••• 
Per capita total household consumption 805 877 993 •• 1294 •• 
Sample size 114 67 116 145 
Note: The "returned RSE" households arc those where the worker hod returned to Tongs by wove 2 of the survey while the "RSE still in NZ" are households where the worker 
was sull at the time of wave 2 of the survey 
~e components of total household mcome and total household con~umption are shown m rabic 2 below 
••• • significant at 0.01, •• significant at 0.05, • - significant at 0.1 for compartson with the mean for the returned RSE households 
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Tahie :?. Hor•schold lllcomc Components. Change~ from Ll~sel inc anu Difference i11 Ditlcrcncc~ tor RSE, Applicant and Non-applicant Househo lds in Tonga 
lnc<)llle Com~1cnts (Pa'ans a/ca[!it:116 months) Chnns c in Income ComEonents (from Baseline! Difference in Dif!crcnces (,·s Control Gro uEs) 
RSE Applicants N<ln·nppl icMts Non-RSE RSE Applicants Nonapplicants Non-RSE Applicants 
!:t} (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) ( f!) (h) ~c)-(f) 
Eamings in T onga 163 360 •• 346 ••• 353 ... ·10 80 74 76 ·90 
"'et remittnnccs ( from RSE) 355 I ••• 0 ••• 0 ..... 355 1 0 0 354 • •• 
Net remittances (fl·om other) so 85 •• 98 ••• 92 ..... -22 5 13 9 -27 
Repatriated RSE earnings 386 0 ••• 0 ...... () ..... 386 0 0 0 386 ... 
/\griculturnl & informal sales .n 96 ••• 101 ••• 99 ••• ·2 15 ·164 -252 -213 ·51 
Subsistence prol.luction 809 918 92 1 920 457 448 385 413 8 
Other income 0 0 2 0 ·3 2 0 3 
Total Hou$ehold Income 1795 1460 •• 1469 •• 1465 •• 951 367 222 2S7 584 ••• 
Cash expenditure 381 396 398 397 -72 ·127 -361 -257 55 
• Totul HOltsehokl Consullll)lion 1 i 90 1315 1319 1317 384 321 ? " 
-=> 157 63 
Sample size I 14 116 145 261 114 116 145 261 230 
Note· '1 he RSE. Mmehotds :are only lhosc where the wo:ker bad rctWJ')((i ((, T OOS,l by W~Ye 2 or the !>U:vcy {lH'loUsehoJd\ where llle worker \ \'M ~till in S"cw Ztotl~d :•re noi indudcd in Toblc 2. 
The non-RSE group IS. th<.· sum of opplicMts and n<.~n-nppltC'~)nts . 
... rutal HQuschoJd <.:onsun1p:.ton i~ c:~"mptised of <:t\h c.."<penditwc plus consum.plion of subsis.ttttce produttion. 
Non-appl icants Non·RSE 
(c)·<s> (e) ·(h) 
-83 · 86 
:l55 .. . . 354 ••• 
-34. -31 • 
386 ... 386 ••• 
36 ·2 
71 43 
·2 0 
72S •" 664 ••• 
288 185 
360 228 
259 375 
,..,.. ;: signifi~nt at 0.01. ... · • ~ignitic:mt at 0.0.$, • ,__ siguilic:tnt :tt 0. L In colurnn!. (b) to (d) sisnifican.:c is tOr comp{u·is('ln \Vilh coiunm (:~). In the dtOCrence in diffcrcnc<:s colwnu" lhc signitkance i'io f\,)r CO."llp¥lson wilh z<ro 
Table 3: Propensity Score Matching Estimates of Average Treatment E ffects on Per Capita Monetary Welfare in Tonga from RSE Participation 
Set of households used as the control group 
Applicant households Applicant + non-applicant households 
Welfare indicator 
Total household income per capita (PCY) 
ln(PCY) 
Total consumption per capita (PCCONS) 
ln(PCCONS) 
Average 
treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT) 
522 
0.508 
-1 
0.029 
Bootstrap 
standard 
error 
153 
0.133 
161 
0.095 
t -statistic 
onATT 
3.41 
3.81 
0.0 1 
0.31 
Average 
treatment effect on 
the treated (ATT) 
566 
0.569 
49 
0.088 
Boots trap 
standard en or 
124 
0.11 2 
99 
0.094 
/-statistic 
onATT 
4.56 
5.06 
0.50 
0.93 
Note: ll1c A 1T estimfltcs only use observations that satisfy· the common suppo11 assumption (n=97 in the comrol group of applicant households and nr 18 1 when both applicrult and 
non-applicant hou~eholds arc used} <md come fi'om n kcmel matching procedure. 
ll1c standard ctTOI'S arc obtaim:d via 100 bootslrap replications. 
The covariatcs used lo r es timating th e propensity scores arc the levels and squares of the baseline characteristics listed in Table 1. 
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